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Chapter 3 
Welfare States and Social Europe 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen

 
In Szyszczak, E., Neergaard, U., Krajewski, M., Gronden, J.W. van de and 
Bastiaans, M. (eds.) (2013) Social Services of General Interest in the EU. TMC 
Asser Press and Springer. 
 
Abstract 
The chapter examines the tensions between welfare states on the one hand and social Europe on the 
other and colliding principles in their historical setting. In particular, the chapter focuses on Social 
Services of General Interest (SSGI) as core institutions of the welfare state and the political 
response to the European impact on these public services, looking in particular at health care and 
long term care. The findings point out that that although Member States attempt to create ‘safe 
havens’ to protect their welfare policies from European law, these may not prove to be lasting 
firewalls against the ‘creeping competences’ of the European Union. Over time SSGI have become 
Europeanized, limiting the scope and policy options for national politicians and national 
administrations. Also the administrative space of SSGI is increasingly multi-level, forcing 
administrators at all levels to take EU rules into account, when welfare programs are designed, 
adopted and administered. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The competence to decide on the content, scope and organization of welfare policies remains within 
national competence in the European Union (EU) as long as the exercise of that competence does 
not contradict EU law. The trick is to balance ‘welfare sovereignty’ and EU law; this constitutes a 
central dilemma for contemporary welfare states in the European Union. The dilemma has only 
intensified over the years.  
Historically, the welfare state construction has been closely linked to the formation and 
consolidation of the nation-state.
1
 The demarcation of the nation, and the territorial borders, of the 
state has traditionally defined social citizenship, i.e. who, when and where to be protected against 
social risks. In its gradual development, welfare came to constitute a decisive means of national 
integration, where material rights and obligations linked the state and civil society together. 
Generally, the modern welfare has been proposed, created and developed for the nation, historically 
aiming at national integration and coherence: 
... the welfare state has always been a national state and this connection is far from coincidental. One of 
the main factors impelling the development of welfare systems has been the desire on the part of 
governing authorities to promote national solidarity. From early days to late on, welfare systems were 
constructed as part of a more generalized process of state building. Who says welfare state says nation-
state.
2
 
From a formal point of view, Member States of the EU still possess social sovereignty. Despite a 
generally intensified process of European integration, social policies have long appeared as a 
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remaining stronghold of the sovereign nation-state against the influence of EU law and policy – ‘an 
island beyond its reach’.3 
The historical meaning of the welfare state in part explains why European integration of welfare is 
ripe with tensions, contradictions and reluctance, since it challenges the original national 
embeddedness of welfare. From a historical point of view, welfare states and social Europe 
contradict one another. National welfare states are underpinned by a logic of ‘closure’ whereas the 
EU is guided by a logic of ‘opening’.4 Whether the tensions between those two logics can somehow 
meet and reconcile in future social Europe remains to be seen.    
This chapter focuses on the tensions between welfare states on the one hand and social Europe on 
the other, but also on how the two entities have gradually been brought together, albeit sometimes 
in an incoherent and conflicting manner. In particular, the chapter focuses on Social Services of 
General Interest (SSGI) as core institutions of the welfare state and the political response to the 
European impact on these public services. Section two below examines Social Europe, its scope and 
content. Section three turns to two specific welfare provisions, defined as social services of general 
interest; health care and long term care and examines the political response to their European 
integration. Section four analyzes the Europeanization of welfare. Finally, some concluding remarks 
are provided. 
  
3.2 Social Europe 
The existence and reach of social Europe has long been debated. Formally regarded, the 
organization of welfare continues to be a national prerogative, and ‘social Europe’ has been laid 
down as ‘the road not taken’.5 Member States have acted as very skeptical gatekeepers when 
welfare initiatives have had to be approved in the Council of Ministers, in this way forcefully 
protecting their prerogatives.
6
 Throughout the decades of European integration, welfare policies 
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have continued as one of the few policy areas where national governments have usually ‘resisted 
losses of political authority, not least because of the electoral significance of most social 
programs.’7 An apparent lasting asymmetry has thus been created:   
…the course of European integration from the 1950s onward has created a fundamental asymmetry 
between policies promoting market efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality.
8
 
Ideas and initiatives on social Europe have thus not been received lightheartedly by welfare state 
representatives. In its content and scope, social Europe contains different dynamics and meanings, 
being pushed forward by some binding laws adopted in the Council, by means of judicial policy-
making, soft law measures and negative integration. Negative integration has been argued to be 
especially characteristic for Social Europe; a process where national welfare policies are integrated 
when EU laws oblige Member States to abolish barriers to the constitutive principles of the 
Community.
9
 A welfare policy constituting such a barrier is, therefore, against the objectives and 
means of the EU polity and must be reformed, causing negative integration.  
As part of a negative integration process, ‘social integration’ means constrained policy options for 
the national welfare state more than a positive build-up of a European social polity.
10
 Indeed this 
asymmetry still exists.
11
  
Positive integration by means of political decision-making encounters many obstacles and veto-
positions to be overcome before a compromise can be established. First, the Commission has to 
internally agree to formulate and present a proposal. Second, the Council of Ministers shall 
negotiate a common position on the ground of unanimity or, increasingly, qualified majority voting 
between 27 Member States. Third, increasingly the Council has to use the co-decision procedure 
with the European Parliament, numbering some 737 members, organized into 7 political groups. An 
initiative developing Social Europe has a long way to go before it emerges as law, and policy 
processes have tended to be rather cumbersome with many thresholds. In this context of 
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cumbersome decision-making, the policy-making process tends to produce outputs where many 
compromises are contained in the written text, ambiguously phrased and open to interpretations. 
Other means to compromises are by inserting an exemption or opt-out in secondary legislation or 
Treaty Protocols, thus bringing on board Member States who are likely to veto proposals, in order 
to establish a common position. As decision-makers in the Council, welfare state representatives 
often act as reluctant players with skeptic attitudes when social initiatives are on the table.
12
  
Despite the reluctance and concerns of politicians, social integration has taken place, even at 
considerable speed. The CJEU has furthered integration, interpreting the ‘law of the land’ beyond 
what national governments could at first accept, but gradually have come to terms with.
13
 This 
dynamic where the Court comes first, opening up for politicians to sometimes codify what the Court 
has already laid down, appears to be a main integrative logic of social Europe. Such integrative 
logic comes out historically as well as in more contemporary dynamics.  
The Treaty of Rome 1957 had very little social content. One Article was inserted at the request of 
Italy, in order to support the free movement of workers, setting out that when a worker moved from 
one Member State to another, s/he had the right to both access the social security schemes of other 
Member States as well as export already earned social security rights to other Member States.
14
  
Another Article was written into the Treaty on the initiative of France, laying down that men and 
women were entitled to equal pay for equal work.
15
 Despite the rather sparsely social content, both 
Articles came to spur social integration significantly. Firstly, for migrant workers’ social security 
rights, the CJEU became decisive in expanding the personal and material scope of cross border 
entitlements. In addition, the Court was crucial in expanding the regulatory meaning of equal pay 
and went further in linking equal treatment with maternity/parental rights. The politicians gradually 
came to respond, revising or adopting secondary legislation to codify the case law.  
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Despite much Member State reticence, the binding norms of EU social regulation have expanded. 
Falkner has counted 80 binding norms in the three main fields of EU social regulation.
16
 In addition, 
about 90 amendments and geographical extensions had been adopted to these binding norms and 
approximately 120 non-binding norms, consisting of soft law measures, recommendations to the 
Member States etc.
17
 Also health care has come under the scope of EU regulation. Concerning the 
recently adopted Directive on patient rights, the integrative logic resembles the one described 
above. The CJEU initated the process of including health care issues within EU law. At first a large 
majority of Member States were opposed to binding measures but as the case law chipped away at 
sovereignty and competence in the area of health care they gradually came round to accepting that 
EU-level legislation was necessary. Thus in co-decision with the European Parliament a first 
Directive on patient rights in cross border health care has been adopted in March 2011.
18
 Section 3 
below will look further into the political response to this process.   
 
3.3 Social Services of General Interest 
The social services of the welfare state build on the same logic of ‘closure’ as welfare in general. It 
can even be argued that their exposure to European integration and the dynamics EU law are 
especially sensitive as SSGI mirror the institutional core of the modern welfare state; health care, 
statutory and complementary social security schemes, as well as personal services; social assistance, 
housing, child care and long term care.
19
 
Therefore integration of social services has often been marked by rather fierce political battles and 
opposition. Politically there have been attempts to rebound social services and shield it against the 
general forces of integration. The heads of government thus inserted a Protocol 26 on services of 
general interest as an annex to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. The Protocol 
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speaks of the national concerns with SSGI, and was inserted in the wake of pressure especially from 
France, the Netherlands and Belgium.
20
 The Protocol emphasizes:  
 Article 2 
The provisions of the Treaties do not affect in any way the competence of Member States to provide, 
commission and organise non-economic services of general interest. 
 
Although the Treaty sets out explicitly that non-economic social services
21
 are special, and 
henceforth should be governed by special rules, they are de facto integrated and increasingly part of 
the supranational regulatory scope as the case-stories of health care and long-term care below 
details. These two social services, however, also bear witness of considerable political resistance 
and opposition along the process of integration. 
  
3.3.1 Health care 
Healthcare constitutes a social service of general interest
22
 and its European integration has been 
greatly disputed as such. When it was laid down by the CJEU that health care is a service within the 
meaning of the Treaty,
23
 it was by no means welcomed by the health ministers of the member 
states. The former German Minister of Health, Seehofer, argued quite impetuously in the wake of 
the judgments, saying that the member states had to overturn the rulings through a Treaty 
amendment and that Germany would not comply with the premises of the judgments.
24
 The former 
Minister found the Decker/Kohll case law ‘revolutionary’ and argued that if Germany adopted its 
premises, it would be a long-term threat to the sustainability of the German health system.
25
 A 
Treaty amendment detailing that internal market principles did not apply to health care was called 
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for.
26
 As we now know, such a Treaty amendment was never adopted. In the end, Member States 
did not prioritize the matter sufficiently when negotiating the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty 
clarification exempting health care from the internal market was not inserted.
27
     
This initial outburst was then later met by significant silence and a long period of no EU initiative. 
The Member States evidently waited for the Commission to take the lead and point out some kind 
of direction. In the meantime, the CJEU moved further in its interpretations on patients’ rights and 
cross border health care. In the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms case,
28
 the Court clarified that 
internal market principles also apply to hospital care, provided as benefits in kind. In the following 
case of Müller-Fauré and Van Riet,
29
 the CJEU proceeded by drawing a distinction between 
hospital care and non-hospital care. For hospital care prior authorization (where the competent 
national institution has the authority to certify a reimbursable right to cross border treatment) may 
under certain condition be justified. For non-hospital care it is, however, found to be an unjustified 
barrier to the free circulation of services. In Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, the Court thus settled that 
for the wide scope of treatment which can be provided without hospitalization, internal market 
principles rule.   
The first attempt to respond to the Court’s rulings came when the Commission, rather 
unsuccessfully, attempted to integrate the health care area in the proposal for a Directive on services 
in the internal market.
30
 As a precise reproduction of the Court’s decisions, Article 23 of the 
Directive proposal set out: 
1) an internal market for non-hospital care, where the patient has a right to seek 
treatment in another member state without prior authorization and subsequently have 
the costs reimbursed by the competent national institution, 
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2) a right to hospitalization in another member state, provided that the State of 
affiliation offers the same treatment, and that authorization has been granted 
beforehand.  
The health ministers, refused to have their policy area regulated as part of a general Directive on 
services, placed under the responsibility of DG Internal Market.
31
 Article 23, and thus the health 
care area, was taken out of the Directive. In general, the adopted version of the Services Directive 
was a much watered down version compared to the original proposal.
32
   
Consequently it appeared clear that European health care could not be regulated from an overall 
internal market perspective, but the case law of the Court still called for political codification and 
more transparency. In September 2006, DG Health (SANCO) communicated a consultation 
procedure on health services. One year later, the Commission made its first attempt to present a 
proposal. DG SANCO announced that the proposal would be presented on 19 December 2007. 
However, on the very same day the Commission decided to withdraw the proposal.
33
 It remains 
unclear exactly what triggered the withdrawal, but the political tensions and concerns that the 
proposal evoked stand out. 
 Many different actors and organizations worked behind the scene in the run-up to the presentation 
of the proposal.
34
 Also the Commission was split internally on the proposal. The College of 
Commissioners disagreed strongly internally on the proposal and its principles. Various cabinets 
appear to have intervened against the proposal just before it was presented, expressing concerns on 
the impact on national health systems.
35
 Others were concerned about how the proposal would be 
received by the public, suggesting that it could cause protests similar to the ones on the Services 
Directive, which again would be damaging during the process of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon 
2009.
36
 Furthermore, members of the European Parliament intervened in the process. Apparently 
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key members of the European Socialists (PES) group urged the Commission to withdraw the 
proposal, arguing that it would have considerable negative consequences for national health care 
systems.
37
 PES members linked the proposal with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, arguing that 
the timing was badly chosen since the Lisbon Treaty remained to be ratified in several member 
states.
38
 In the end, the Commission decided not to present the proposal.  
However, it did not take more than half a year to ease the pressure on the Commission and to 
internally agree that a new proposal could be presented. On 2 July 2008, the Commission was 
successful in proposing the Directive on patient rights.
39
  
Also the subsequent negotiation process has been tense and ripe with conflicts on different 
dimensions of the proposal. The European Parliament has had its difficulties to establish a majority 
position. The PES group in the Parliament was divided internally on various issues, especially on 
the fundamental question of the correct legal base for the Directive and the issue of prior 
authorization. Also the Greens and the united left GUE/NGL were against that the legal base of the 
Directive was proposed as the internal market Article 114 TFEU and not Article 168 TFEU dealing 
with public health.
40
 In June 2009, the Commission agreed to meet the Council and Parliamentary 
concerns to some extent, for example by agreeing to remove long term health care from the 
regulatory scope of the proposal and to include Article 168 TFEU as part of the legal base.
41
 The 
Council of Ministers continued its disputes on the content of the proposal. A significant number of 
Ministers expressed concerns on national sovereignty, and wished to tighten national control in 
cross border care by means of prior authorization. Especially Southern Europe expressed concerns, 
and in December 2009 Spain led a blocking minority against the Swedish Presidency compromise 
text, and the Council thus failed to reach an agreement. However, during 2010 disagreements were 
eased. The Council reached a common position during the Spanish Presidency and the European 
Parliament gathered a majority on their second reading January 2011. By March 2011 the Directive 
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was adopted by both Institutions. The adopted text differs from the original proposal by the 
Commission on several aspects. A dual legal basis has been reached. The internal market legal base 
Article 114 TFEU constitutes the main legal basis,
42
 but Article 168 TFEU (on public health) has 
also been inserted. Another significant compromise is that prior authorization is accepted as means 
of national control, but only allowed for: 
1) care subject to planning; hospitalization or use of highly specialized or cost-intensive 
medical infrastructure or equipment; 
2)  treatments involving a particular risk for the patient or the population; 
3)  providers raising serious concerns relating to quality and safety (Article 8 (2) of the 
Directive). 
The process which finally reached a compromise on patient rights in cross border care substantiates 
that it took the representatives of the welfare states in the Council and a considerable part of 
European Parliamentarians quite some time to accept that health care as a service of general interest 
falls under the rules of the internal market. The politicians managed to negotiate some exemptions 
to the general rule of free movement, but the process also substantiates that despite such political 
reservations, it is now a European binding norm that health care constitutes a service within the 
meaning of the Treaty, with all its implications. The transposition and practical application of the 
directive in EU 27 will probably confirm that the reach of Social Europe goes much beyond what 
the member governments thought they signed to in the Council, March 2011.  
 
3.3.2 Long term care 
Long term care is another SSGI representing one if the core institutions of the welfare state. As with 
health care, its integration into EU law and policy has not been lightheartedly received by the 
Member States, which have long resisted that long term care should be regulated by the EU. The 
adoption of the patient rights’ directive stands out as the recent example of the political 
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unwillingness to integrate long term care into the EU regulatory scope.
43
 Despite such resistance, 
long term care is in fact regulated by EU rules, both through soft and hard law mechanisms.  
Long term care benefit represents one of those social services which could not easily have been 
appreciated back when the first building blocks of social Europe was laid down.
44
 The first 
regulations coordinating the social security rights of migrant workers did not include long term care 
as part of their material scope.
45
 Although today it is a core part of many European welfare states 
and a social benefit which receives much attention in times of an ageing European population, long 
term care took quite some time to be defined as a social service.
46
 Despite the fact that ‘reliance on 
care’ has always existed as a social phenomenon, long term care did not figure as an independent or 
conceptualised social security risk in European or international conventions at the end of the 
1970s.
47
 Although by no means being a ‘new’ social task, it is a social service which, in some 
member states, has only lately become a part of public welfare, and has been institutionalized 
beyond the more immediate care provided by the family.  
Today, however, long term care is regulated in the EU by the open method of coordination (omc). 
This soft law measure focuses on the access, quality and sustainability and compares long term care 
policies in the Member States. The service is provided very diversified within the EU. Long term 
care may be delivered in long-stay institutions, i.e. residential long term care services, within day 
centers or within individual homes, i.e. home care service.
48
 Also the service availability differs 
across Europe. In Scandinavia there is a high reliance on formal care, whereas in for example 
Southern Europe, long term care has traditionally been provided by family members and formal 
care remains limited.
49
 Furthermore, the financing of long term care differs considerably. In 
Germany, Luxembourg and Spain public schemes are financed by social insurance. In the Nordic 
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countries and Latvia by means of taxes. UK and Cyprus has means tested schemes. Belgium, France 
and Greece provide long term care by means of a mixed financing system which combines 
insurance and taxes.
50
 When addressing sustainability, these financing systems become crucial. In 
the current time of financial and economic crisis, it can only be expected that the EU will gather 
further momentum to address the sustainability of long term care schemes, not least with the 
prospects of an ageing population.  
Whereas, the omc is the new approach to place long term care on the European agenda, the social 
service has, for more than a decade, been regulated by hard law as part of the scheme coordinating 
social security rights of migrant persons.
51
 As with health care, the inclusion of long term care 
within the scope of EU law was not initially welcomed by the Member States, and again 
exemplifies how SSGI are key concerns to the national politicians, preferring to maintain these 
benefits outside the reach of EU law.    
Regulation 883/2004 (former Regulation 1408/71) on the coordination of social security rights 
applies to all EU citizens as well as their family members. The Regulation is based on a principle of 
equal treatment, meaning that persons covered by the regulation are equal in terms of the social 
rights and obligations provided for by the national legislation. Furthermore, the Regulation is based 
on a principle of exportability according to which one can export/maintain the social security rights 
that one has achieved in one member state if moving to another Member State. This principle of 
exportability came to clash with the residence requirements of both the German and Austrian long 
term care program, and again mirrors a process where the CJEU furthered the meaning and scope of 
European law beyond what the national politicians thought they had agreed to.  
Germany adopted its law on long term care (‘Pflegeversicherungsgesetz’), as late as 1995, thereby 
for the first time recognizing long term care as an independent social risk.
52
 Before the adoption of 
the care insurance law, long term care was publicly granted as a social assistance benefit, or 
privately provided and financed.
53
 With its long-term care law, any person in Germany insured 
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against sickness is compulsory insured in the long-term care scheme. The service was financed by 
contributions from both workers and employers. A social insurance member reliant on care became 
entitled to care in a nursing home or in his/her own home. If one should desire home care, the law 
also designated a possibility to choose either care as a benefit in kind, or as a monthly allowance, 
i.e. ‘Pflegegeld’ where an individual should purchase the care. 
The monthly cash allowance quickly turned out to be the preferred form of home care. From the 
outset, 80% of those in home care chose the cash benefit.
54
 However, the German politicians 
inserted a residence requirement in the law, setting out that the entitlement to the German 
‘Pflegegeld’ was suspended if one took up residence abroad. The law thus demarcated the social 
provisions within national borders.  
Whether the territorial demarcation of the German ‘Pflegegeld’ contradicted EU law was examined 
in Molenaar.
55
 The case discussed the right to ‘Pflegegeld’ of Mr and Mrs Molenaar, a Dutch, 
German couple, working in Germany but living in France. They were both voluntarily insured 
against sickness in Germany and were, from January 1995, required to pay care insurance 
contributions, which they did. However, on application, they were informed by the competent 
German social security fund that they were not entitled to care insurance benefits due to their 
French residence.  
The CJEU initiated its legal reasoning by referring to previous case law, stating that a benefit was to 
be regarded as a social security benefit if granted ‘on the basis of a legally defined position and 
provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4 (1)’ of Regulation 1408/71 
(para. 20 of the judgment). It added that the list of Article 4 (1), laying down the material scope of 
the regulation, was exhaustive, meaning that a branch of social security not mentioned in this article 
was not part of the regulatory scope. Long term care, such as the German ‘Pflegeversicherung’, was 
to be regarded as a sickness benefit within the meaning of Article 4 (1) (a) of Regulation 1408. 
Having in this way included the care allowance within the material scope of 1408/71, the Court 
continued by examining whether the residence clause of German law could be justified against the 
Community principle of exportability.  
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Article 19 of Regulation 1408/71 made a distinction between benefits in kind and benefits in cash. 
The competent institution was - and is – obliged to export sickness benefits in cash, but not benefit 
in kind.
56
 Although a monthly cash allowance, ‘Pflegegeld’ was defined as a benefit in kind in 
German law, thus according to German law exempting it from exportability. From the drafting of 
the law, it appears to have been a deliberate and important consideration to define a de facto ‘cash 
benefit’ as a ‘benefit in kind’. More specifically, the draft of the ‘Pflegeversicherungsgesetz’ 
defended the point of view, setting out that the care allowance constituted a ‘benefit in kind-
substitute’, a ‘Sachleistungssurrogat’.57 Nevertheless, the CJEU did not accept the national 
classification, but ruled that the German care allowance was indeed a benefit in cash (para. 36 of the 
judgment). As a consequence thereof, the overall conclusion was that the residence clause in 
German law conflicted with the principle of exportability of Regulation 1408/71.  
The later case of Jauch
58
 confirmed that long-term care falls within the scope of European law and 
is exportable in accordance herewith. Jauch concerned a German national, residing in Germany, but 
who had worked in Austria where he was affiliated to the social security scheme. The Austrian 
welfare state had, however, denied him long-term care, since he was not a habitual resident in 
Austria, and since Austria had specified that long-term care was a non-exportable social service.
59
 
The Austrian government argued before the ECJ that because the member governments had decided 
that the benefit was exempted from exportability in accordance with a special rule of non-
exportability inserted in Regulation 1408/71, the residence clause of Austrian law did not 
contravene EU law. The CJEU nevertheless ruled against the Austrian position, laying down that 
the character of the Austrian care allowance was no different from the German ‘Pflegegeld’; 
 . . . while care allowance may possibly have a different legal regime at the national level, it nevertheless 
remains of the same kind as the German care insurance benefits at issue in Molenaar, and is likewise 
granted objectively on the basis of a legally defined situation.
60
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The Molenaar and Jauch cases thus exemplify the attempts of Germany and Austria to exempt their 
welfare benefits from exportability, and so to speak to construct ‘safe havens’ in both national and 
EU law.
61
 The cases also demonstrate that such ‘safe havens’ may not prove to be lasting firewalls 
around national social services in the long run. It can be argued that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to remain insulated on the island or in the ‘safe haven’, protected from the waves and 
dynamics of EU law.  
 
3.4 The Europeanization of welfare 
Health care and long term care both constitute social services of general interest which despite their 
traditional national boundedness, have been Europeanized. Europeanization has become a 
prominent analytical concept in European Union studies, defined a national change or processes of 
change caused by European integration.
62
 When examining the impact of the EU on national 
politics and law, the Europeanization framework is helpful in setting out how national institutions 
are changed and why EU induced processes of change may not lead to convergence of domestic 
schemes. A Europeanization approach details that EU imperatives of change, be they case law from 
the CJEU, soft law mechanisms or the binding law of a Directive, do not automatically lead to 
national change.
63
 Between an EU decision and de facto national change there is a long list of 
intervening variables which can be decisive to the actual EU impact. Judicial policy-making by 
means of CJEU case law may meet severe national obstacles and national re-interpretations of what 
the Court actually said, for which reason a significant case may not cause national change in the 
first place. On the other hand a case, or Directive, may be used strategically by domestic actors to 
justify why a reform is needed.
64
 At a first glance the implementation of a Directive or Regulation 
may appear more straightforward and less open to national interpretations. Nevertheless, also the 
implementation of Council decision-making has proven to leave a significant scope of maneuver to 
the national executive when the measures are to be transposed into national law and practices. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
61
 Szyszczak, this volume. 
 
62
 Börzel and Panke 2010. 
 
63
 Schmidt 2002; Radaelli 2003; Caporaso 2007. 
 
64
 Martinsen and Vrangbæk 2009; Kallestrup 2005. 
 
17 
 
However, when adding the long term perspective, non-compliance with European law is likely to be 
addressed by the different enforcement mechanisms of the EU; infringement procedures by the 
Commission, EU law enforced in national courts or preliminary references to the CJEU which 
review, monitor and eventually sanction a disobedient Member State. Compared to other 
international organizations, the EU has developed efficient enforcement-management mechanisms, 
through which detected and pursued, non-compliance is pointed out to be a merely temporal 
phenomenon.
65
 In sum, the Europeanization approach tells us that we should not expect EU 
decisions to impact directly on national welfare states, but instead expect EU induced change to be 
filtered and influenced by national institutions and actors. Compliance studies add to this 
perspective, detailing that the EU polity has unique instruments of enforcing and managing eventual 
national non-compliance.
66
 These instruments reduce the national scope of maneuver over time, 
potentially leading welfare states to gradually change in accordance with their European 
obligations.  
Welfare Europeanization is likely to be reluctant, strongly influenced by national forces, but also 
checked and balanced by national and supranational enforcement institutions. Europeanization 
involves at least four steps of change before the output takes a more finalized form. First of all, the 
EU cause differs. National actors and institutions may decide to simply ignore a soft law measure as 
there are no formal sanctions linked to such, and obligations vary as to whether the EU cause of 
change is set out in case law or a Directive. As a second step, transposition allows for governments, 
administrations and interest organizations to respond to and (re)interpret the EU imperative laid 
down. Transposition lays down the judicial implementation where EU decisions by means of hard 
law become national legislation. Thirdly, in the phase of practical application local, regional or 
central parts of the administration will transcend the law into practice. Even rules may, however, 
often transcend into uneven practices, depending on administrative capacities, understandings of 
EU obligations and/or different cultures of compliance at the sublevels of European 
administration.
67
 Fourthly, the ability to detect and prosecute non-compliance is decisive to the 
extent the EU polity can render implementation deficits into sufficient compliance with European 
                                                          
65
 Tallberg 2002, p. 614. 
 
66
 Tallberg 2002; 2003. 
 
67
 Falkner et al. 2005; Versluis 2007. 
 
18 
 
obligations.
68
 Evaluation and enforcement at the end of the Europeanization process is thus 
fundamental to the extent to which a correct output is produced, and objectives and means become 
de facto impact. Together the four steps of Europeanization demonstrate that a process of EU 
induced change is far from automatic, but one with high thresholds and significant discretionary 
scope.  
 
Figure 1 – Processes of welfare Europeanization69 
 
Over the years a significant Europeanization of welfare, and social services of general interest, has 
taken place. The market building process of the EU implies considerable social integration through 
the abolition of national barriers to the internal market.
70
 Free movement principles and competition 
law
71
 are thus fundamental challenges to the traditional logic of ‘closure’ to the Member States.72 
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Furthermore, the principle of non-discrimination prohibits the traditional demarcation of solidarity 
in the welfare states, where solidarity has been for ‘members only’, i.e. the citizens of the state.73 
European integration implies a fundamental challenge to the ‘right to bound’, meaning ‘the right of 
each national welfare state to autonomously determine who can/must share what with whom’.74 
Today all European citizens can legitimately access the welfare communities of other Member 
States. Held against the traditional logic of ‘closure’, this is indeed a major EU impact on the 
traditional organization of the welfare state.    
Specific policies such as health care and long term care are affected by European integration. The 
two core institutions of the welfare state can no longer be reserved to the national population, nor 
can they be preserved within the national borders. Concerning health care, national administrations 
have lost the upper hand of control. In the future, they will continuously have to justify if a health 
care service can only be consumed at home. If they refuse a cross border treatment, the European 
citizen has a right to challenge the refusal by means of judicial redress. Furthermore, national 
providers’ ability to plan will need to take outflows but also a potential inflow of foreign patients 
into account. In addition, welfare authorities will have to set up national contact centers with the 
task to inform European patients of national health care supplies, prices and quality. Healthcare 
packages and services thus need to be comparable across borders. This may set off new dynamics 
where patients acting as voters demand different standards or types of national treatments. New 
demands will be voiced and national health care packages will be compared with the supply from 
other Member States. That changes in supply go hand in hand with changes in demand is already 
evident in the global growth in medical tourism, where patients travel abroad for health care not 
available in their home state or cheaper elsewhere.
75
  
Regarding long term care, the cases of Molenaar and Jauch, examined above, have already set out 
how the case law of the Court impacted on the way long term care was organized, and demarcated, 
in Germany and Austria. The cases demonstrate that although the German and Austrian welfare 
states deliberately attempted to exempt these social services from the principle of exportability, the 
‘safe havens’ they constructed were not lasting preemptions. The idea to construct a ‘benefit in 
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kind-substitute’, a ‘Sachleistungssurrogat’ did not stand the test before the Court.76 This 
demonstrates that in the longer run, the discretionary scope of the national executive on how to 
organize their social services of general interests is indeed limited. European integration impacts on 
both the transposition and practical application of social services of general interest. In this way, EU 
law limits the policy options of the welfare states. When national policies are drafted several ideas 
are likely to end as non-decisions in order to prevent the impact of EU law. Welfare politicians and 
bureaucrats are likely to think more than twice on whether to design long term care as a ‘benefit in 
cash’, knowing that such service will then be exportable to pensioners who have taken up residence 
in, for example, Southern Europe or elsewhere beyond national borders.  
The administration of social services has in this way been Europeanized, which implies 
considerable challenges to the national bureaucracy at all administrative levels. From an overall 
perspective the EU’s regulatory competences on social services of general interests are diffuse, 
differing between direct or indirect hard law measures and non-binding comparisons and 
recommendations. The individual provision may not fundamentally challenge the administration of 
welfare, but added together the different bits and pieces of regulation becomes rather deep 
intervention in the administrative autonomy of the welfare state. The fact that social services fall 
within the scope of EU law implies that welfare administrations EU-wide have to take the rules into 
account, when welfare programmes are designed, adopted and administered. Additionally local 
public authorities have to apply EU rules on state aid and public procurement as well as administer 
their national laws of social services in accordance with EU law and policy. Thus we find 
Europeanization at the ultimate end of the administrative order, and the different units of local 
authorities are unlikely to posses the administrative capacity to take Europe into account in their 
daily practices. The lack of capacity is substantiated when public authorities notify the Commission 
that the application of the relevant EU rules to the national policies on social services causes 
problems.
77
 
 Local authorities especially have found the application difficult, viewing the different EU rules as 
an obstacle to organize and finance high quality social services. The Commission has responded 
that the difficulties are mainly caused by the lack of awareness or misinterpretation of the rules 
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rather than the rules themselves. Disregarding such disagreements on reasons, the discussion 
substantiates that the administrative space of social services is no longer demarcated by national 
borders or to national communities, but is increasingly Europeanized – at all levels.   
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Social services of general interests are core institutions of the welfare state, traditionally rooted in 
the same logic of ‘closure’ as the welfare state in general. From the outset the constitutive principles 
of the welfare state and social Europe are contradictions in terms, the former building on a logic of 
‘closure’ and the latter on a logic of ‘opening’.78 The historical logic of the welfare state can, in 
part, explain the tension when it meets with Social Europe. Having once been a key means of 
national integration, it is now gradually obliged to Europeanize. Both social integration and 
Europeanization has taken place. By means of negative integration, separate Council decisions, 
judicial policy-making and soft law measures, the EU impacts on the core of the national welfare 
state. Over time, a Social Europe has been conceived, albeit sometimes in an incoherent and 
conflicting manner.  
This chapter has focused on the tense interaction between the welfare state and Social Europe, 
looking into the political responses to the integration and Europeanization of SSGI. Despite political 
reluctance and veto-positions, welfare state representatives have gradually had to accept the reach 
of EU law. The case studies of health care and long term care demonstrate that although Member 
Sstates attempt to create ‘safe havens’, these may not prove to be lasting firewalls against the 
‘creeping competences’ of the European Union.79 Over time SSGI have become Europeanized, 
limiting the scope and policy options for national politicians and national administrations. The 
administrative space of SSGI is increasingly multi-level, forcing administrators at all levels to take 
EU rules into account, when welfare programs are designed, adopted and administered. Much has 
happened since SSGI were islands beyond the reach of European law.
80
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